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5. The `Abbasids' Attitude toward the activities of al-Hadi
According to the Imamite sources; the bulk of the followers of alJaw5d
accepted the Imamate of his successor `Ali al-Hadi, who
was then seven years old. His age presented no obstacle
to their accepting his Imamate, since they had faced the
same problem with his father, who had also been seven
years old when he took over the office. A few of
al-Jawad's followers, however, supported the Imamate of
his son Musa, but after a short time they rejoined the
rest of the Imamites, accepting the Imamate of `Ali
al-Hadi(1).
At this stage the Imamites concentrated their efforts in reorganising
the activities of their followers. This was especially
necessary considering the fact that the flourishing
state of the 'Abbasid economy had decreased the `Alids'
opportunities to obtain supporters for further military
action(2).
Perhaps for this reason the caliph, al-Mu'tasim and his successor
al-Wathiq (227-232/841-846), were more tolerant towards
the `Alids than al-Ma’mun before them or al-Mutawakkil
after them. According to Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahani, the
descendants of `Ali b. Abi Talib and their close kindred
(al-Talibiyun) assembled in Samarra where they were
paid salaries by the caliph al-Wathiq(3).
The latter also distributed a large amount of money
among the `Alids in the Hijaz and other provinces(4).
After the death of al-Wathiq certain events had serious consequences for
the `Abbasid attitude towards the activities.of the
adherents of the tenth Imam, al-Hadi. Al-Mutawakkil was
chosen to the caliphate in 232/837,(5)
and his installation was seen by the narrators
(al-Muhaddithun al-amma) as a major setback for those
who favoured the `Alids. The majority of the latter were
from the ranks of the Mu'tazila and the Shi’ites, who
formed the progressive and indeed radical element in
society. Recognising this, alMutawakkil carried out
certain measures with the aim of destroying the economic
and political foundations of both the Mu'tazila and the
Shi’ites.
Firstly, he abandoned the"inquisition" (al-Mihna) against the narrators
of the amma, which had been implemented by al-Ma mun
with the support of the Mu`tazilites, and he encouraged
these narrators and their adherents to openly adopt
anti-Shi’ite slogans(6).
Secondly, al-Mutawakkil discharged the vizier, al-Zayyat, and his staff
from their offices and appointed instead al-Jarjara`i
and Ibn Khaqan, who were more inclined to go along to
with his anti-Shi’ite policy(7).
Thirdly, he decided to rebuild the whole structure of the army in two
stages. First he began to gradually weaken the power of
the Tahirids, who were in charge of ruling Khurasan and
of policing Baghdad and the Sawad. He did this by
nominating his three sons, alMuntasir, al-Mu`tazz and
al-Mu'ayyad, as his successive heirs apparent, and then
appointing al-Muntasir as governor in Ifriqiyya and
al-Maghrib, al-Mu'ayyad as governor in Syria, and
al-Mu'tazz as ruler of the eastern provinces, in
particular Khurasan.
Simultaneously the caliph divided the army in the capital among his sons
and sent them to the provinces to which he had appointed
them, so as to prevent any direct conspiracy on the part
of the leaders of the army. His second move was to begin
to build a new army called alShakiriyya, recruiting
people from areas which were well-known for their
anti-`Alid attitudes, particularly from Syria,
al-Jazira, al-Jabal, Hijaz, and even from the `Abna ,
who had rebelled against the "inquisition"(8).
While carrying out these measures, al-Mutawakkil turned towards the
opposition to deal with the organised underground
activities of the `Alids in general and the Imamites in
particular. The intellectual activities of the Imamites
in Egypt, which had been encouraged by Isma`il b. Musa
al-Kazim, had borne fruit and expanded into the sphere
of underground political activities, even penetrating
into remote parts of North Africa(9).
The system of communication of their organization (al-Wikala) was highly
developed, particulary in the capital Samarra, Baghdad,
Mada`in, and the districts of the Sawad(10).
Furthermore al-Yaqubi's report seems to indicate that the Imamites had
hidden the name of their Imam to the extent that the
caliph was not sure exactly who he was(11)
or if he had direct links with Shi’ite underground
activities.
Al-Mutawakkil instigated a campaign of arrests against the Imamites in
232/846, accompanied by such harsh treatment that some
of the agents of the Imam in Baghdad, Mada`in, Kufa and
the Sawad died under torture, while others were thrown
into jail(12).
By these measures the caliph caused serious damage to the communication
network within the Wikala. In order to fill the vacuum
left by the arrested agents, the Imam had to appoint new
agents instead, such as Abu `Ali b. Rashid, who was
nominated to lead the activites of the Imamites in
Baghdad, Mada`in and the Sawad, and Ayyub b. Nuh, who
was appointed as the agent of Kufa. Al-Hadi also
provided them with new instructions concerning their
duties during this critical situation(13).
Despite all the Imamite efforts to save their organization, the
investigation of the governor of Medina, `Abd Allah b.
Muhammad, led to the discovery that al-Hadi was in fact
behind these activities. He informed al-Mutawakkil,
warning him of the danger of al-Hades presence in
Medina. So the caliph summoned al-Hadi to Samarra in
233/848, where he kept him under house-arrest(14).
Two years later the caliph discovered that Egypt and the
areas near the tomb of alHusayn in the Sawad were the
strongest centres of the underground communications of
the `Alids. Therefore he ordered that the tomb of
al-Husayn and the houses nearby be levelled to the
ground. Then he ordered that the ground of the tomb be
ploughed and cultivated, so that any trace of the tomb
would be forgotten. Furthermore he issued an order
prohibiting people from visiting the tombs of any of the
Imams and warning them that anyone found in their
vicinity would be arrested(15).
Al-Mutawakkil also waged another campaign of arrests. Among those taken
prisoner was Yahya b. `Umar al-`Alawi, who was accused
of conspiracy and held in the jail of al-Mutbaq in
Baghdad(16).
At the same time al-Mutawakkil ordered the governor of
Egypt to deport the Talibiyyin to Iraq, and he did so.
Afterwards in 236/850,(17)
alMutawakkil banished them to Medina which had been
used as a place of exile for the `Alids.
Several remarks suggest that al-Mutawakkil went even further in his
policy, aiming in the long term to destroy the economic
and social status of the `Alids, and issued many orders
so as to achieve this end. He confiscated the properties
of the Husaynids, that is the estate of Fadak, whose
revenue at that time, according to Ibn Tawus, was 24,000
dinars, and granted it to his partisan `Abd Allah b.
`Umar al-Bazyar(18).
He also warned the inhabitants of the Hijaz not to have any communication
with the `Alids or to support them financially. Many
people were severely punished because they did so.
According to al-Isfahani, as a result of al-Mutawakkil's
measures the `Alids faced harsh treatment in Medina,
where they were totally isolated from other people and
deprived of their necessary livelihood(19).
The caliph also wanted to remove the Shi’ites from the `Abbasid
administration and to destroy their good standing in
public opinion. Al-Mas'udi gives an example of this
policy: he mentions that Ishaq b. lbrahim, the governor
of Saymara and Sirawan in the province of al-Jabal, was
discharged from his office because of his Imamite
allegiance, and that other people lost their positions
for the same reason(20).
According to al-Kindi, al-Mutawakkil ordered his governor in Egypt to
deal with the `Alids according to the following rules:
1) No `Alid could be given an estate or be allowed to ride a horse or to
move from al-Fustat to the other towns of the province.
2) No `Alid was permitted to possess more than one slave.
3) If there was any conflict between an `Alid and a non`Alid, the judge
must first hear the claim of the non-Alid, and then
accept it without negotiation with the `Alid.(21)
By these measures, al-Mutawakkil managed to prevent the Shi’ites from
plotting against his regime, but he failed to end their
underground activities. Reports indicate that al-Hadi
continued his communications with his adherents
secretly, receiving the khums and other taxes from his
agents in Qumm and its districts(22).
According to al-Mas'udi, al-Mutawakkil was informed
about this, and he also heard that in al-Hadi's house
there were arms and letters from his supporters
indicating a conspiracy against him. Therefore the house
was searched by the caliph's soldiers, but they did not
find any proof, and so al-Hadi was set free(23).
The suppression of the Imamites decreased after the assassination of
al-Mutawakkil, who was succeeded by his son al-Muntasir
in 247/861. He was more tolerant toward them than his
father. He issued an order to stop the campaign of
arrests and the oppression of the `Alids and their
adherents, and permitted them to visit the tombs of
al-Husayn and the other Imams. He also gave the
properties of Fadak back to them. But this new attitude
on the part of the caliph ceased with the succession of
al-Mustain in 248/862.(24)
According to al-Kindi, the Imamites in Egypt were persecuted by its
governor, Yazid b. `Abd Allah al-Turki, who arrested an
`Alid leader called Ibn Abi Hudra along with his
followers. They were accused of carrying out underground
activities and deported to Iraq in 248/862.(25)
Al-Kulayni also states that the campaign of arrests and
pursuits affected the followers of al-Hadi in Egypt. For
example, Muhammad b. Hajar was slain and the estate of
Sayf b. al-Layth was seized by the ruler(26).
Meanwhile in Iraq some of the followers of al-Hadi in Samarra were
arrested(27),
and his main agent in Kufa, Ayyub b. Nuh, was pursued by
the qadi of the city(28).
It appears, however, that the `Abbasid oppression did not deter the
Shi’ite ambition to reach power. Many historians like
al-Isfahani report that `Alid revolts broke out in
250-1/864-5 in the areas of Kufa, Tabaristan, Rayy,
Qazwin, Egypt and Hijaz.
These might have been directed by one group, or to be more accurate, by
one leader. It is beyond the scope of this work to deal
with the details of these revolts, but it is worth
mentioning that the rebels employed the Prophetic
traditions concerning al-Qa’im al-Mahdi and the signs of
his rising to achieve immediate political success.
According to Ibn `Uqda, the leader of this uprising,
Yahya b. `Umar al-`Alawi, was expected to be al-Qa’im
al-Mahdi, because all the signs and events predicted by
the sixth Imam, al-Sadiq, regarding the rise of al-Qa’im
al-Mahdi occured during the course of that revolution(29):
This document indicates that the Imamites were expecting the
establishment of their state by al-Qa’im al-Mahdi in the
near future. Despite the uprising's Zaydite facade, many
pure Imamites participated. According to Ibn `Uqda, the
holder of the rebel standard in Mecca was Muhammad b.
Ma`ruf al-Hilali (d. 250/864), who was among the eminent
Imamites of the Hijaz(30).
Furthermore, the leader' of the rebels in Kufa, Yahya b. `Umar, who was
assassinated in 250/864, attracted the sympathy and
praise of al-Hadi's agent, Abu Hashim al-Ja’fari(31).
In addition al-Mas`udi reports that a certain `Ali b. Musa b. Isma'il b.
Musa al-Kazim took part in the revolt in Rayy and was
arrested by the caliph al-Mu`tazz. Since this man was
the grandson of the Isma'il b. Musa al-Kazim who had
preached the Imamite doctrine in Egypt, it seems
extremely probable that the revolt was essentially
Imamite(32).
Moreover, al-Tabari gives information concerning the underground
activities of the Imamites and their role in this
rebellion, which the authorities considered purely
Zaydite rather than Imamite. He also reports that the
`Abbdsid spies discovered correspondence between the
leader of the rebels in Tabaristan, al-Hasan b. Zayd,
and the nephew of Muhammad b. `Ali b. Khalf al-`Attar.
Both of these men were adherents of the tenth Imam,
al-Hadi(33).
This led the authorities to the conclusion that the Imamites had direct
links with the rebels. So they arrested the leading
Imamite personalities in Baghdad and deported them to
Samarra. Among them were Muhammad b. `Ali al-Attar, Abu
Hashim al-Ja’fari(34),
and the two sons of al-Hadi, Ja`far and al-Hasan
al-`Askari, later to be the eleventh Imam(35).
One can link these `Abbasid precautions
to the sudden death of al-Hadi in Samarra in 254/868,
because the authorities believed him to be behind all
these disturbances, and felt that his death would bring
them to an end(36).
(2)The flourishing state of
the 'Abbasid economy can be noted in
al-Mu`tasim's ability to recruit a new garrison,
mainly from the Turks of Caucasus, and to
establish a new capital, Samarra. His successor
al-Mutawakkil followed in his footsteps,
establishing another garrison, which he called
al-Shakiriyya, by recruiting people from the
western provinces of the empire. Later
al-Shakiriyya garrison was enlarged by
al-Mutawakkil until it became his official army.
Furthermore he established a new capital called
al-Ja’fariyya. According to alMas'udi, after
his death he left four million dinars and seven
million dirhams in the treasury. Muruj, VII,
276-7; Shaban, op. cit., 76.
(3)Maqalat, 394; al-Fakhri,
176.
(6)Shaban, op. cit., 73;
al-Tikriti, al-Mutawakkil boyn Khusumih
wa-Ansarih, Bulletin of the College of Arts,
Basrah University, 1976, 113.
(7)Tabari, III, 1373-5; see
also al-Kafi, I, 498.
(8)Shaban, op. cit., 72-5; 76.
(9)Al Mas`udi and Ibn Hazm
mention that Ja`far b. Isma`il b. Musa al-Kazim
was killed by Ibn al-Aghlab in al-Maghrib during
the caliphate of al Mu`tazz (Muruj, VII, 404;
Ibn Hazm, op. cit., 64), which suggests that
Ja`far may have been sent there by his father to
preach to the people concerning the `Alids'
rights to the caliphate.
(12)Ikhtiyar, 603, 607; T.
al-Ghayba, 226-7; Bihar, L, 183.
(14)Ithbat, 225-6; Bihar, L,
209.
(15)Tabari, III, 407; Muruj
VII, 302. Many early sources represent the
`Abbasid view, and contemporary scholars claim
that the reason behind the demolition of al-Husayn's
tomb was that the Shi’ a had made it an
alternative centre for pilgrimage (Maqatil, 395;
al-Tikriti The Religious Policity of al-Mutawakkil
'Ala Allah al-`Abbasi (232-47/847-68), M. A.
Dissertation (McGill University, Canada, 1969),
58, 63). But all the narrations espousing this
view are attributed to a single narrator called
Ahmad b. al-Ji'd who was a loyal supporter of
the `Abbasids. Perhaps he gave this
interpretation to excuse the action of the
caliph, whose aim was to stop the underground
activities of the Shi’a, who used their visit to
the tomb of al-Husayn as a means of
communication. In addition the caliph wanted to
eliminate any sign of the grave, which might
revive the revolutionary trends amongst the
Shi`a.
(17)al-Kindi, Wilat Misr,
(Beirut, 1972), 177-8.
(18)Ibn Tawus, Kash al-Mahajja
(Najaf, 1950), 124; al-Sadr, Fadak fi al-Tarrikh
(Najaf, 1955), 23.
(20)Muruj VII, 238-9; al-Kafi,
I, 500.
(21)al-Kindi, op. cit., 230.
(25)al-Kindi, op. cit., 229.
(26)al-Kafi, I, 511, 513.
(28)al-Arbili, Kashf
al-Ghumma, III, 247. The qadi of Kufa at that
time was Ja`far b. `Abd al-Wahid. The caliph
al-Musta`in removed him from this office and
exiled him to Basra where he died in 257/780;
Mizan, I, 413.
(29)Ibn `Uqda, op. cit., f.
74-5.
(30)Ibn `Uqda, op. cit., f.
75; al-Najashi, 280-1. Ibn `Uqda, Ahmad b.
Muhammad (249-333/863-944) is a kufan Muhaddith.
He belonged to the Zaydite sect, al-Jarudiyya.
Al-Nu'mani relied on him in writing his work
al-Ghayba. Buzurg, Nawabigh al-Ruwat, 46-7.
(33)Tabari, III, 1362, 1683;
Ikhtiyar, 68.
(35)T. al-Ghayba, 141, 226;
Bihar, L, 206-7.
(36)The majority of the
Imamite scholars believe that al-Hadi was
poisoned at the instigation of the `Abbasids;
Manaqib, IV, 401; Bihar, L, 206-7.
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