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In his relations with his agents Abu Ja’far was careful to leave no trace
which the authorities could use against him and which
would jeopardise both his own life and that of the Imam.
Al‑Saduq reports a secret meeting between Abu Ja’far and
Ibn Matil, one of the ten agents in Baghdad. Abu Ja`far
took Ibn Matil to a ruin in al`Abbasiyya in Baghdad,(1)
where he read a letter written to him by the Twelfth
Imam and then tore it to pieces(2).
To evade any government spies Abu Ja` far also did not
implicate himself in any direct contact with agents from
remote provinces. He used to order any person who
brought letters or money to put them in a certain place,
and he would give him no receipt(3).
Another narration indicates that the second Saf’irhad established a
complicated system of communications between himself and
the agents in the Imamite areas. There seems to have
been a secret code reserved for the Saf’irand his
agents, while the messengers were sometimes ignorant of
both the contents of their messages and the code. For
example, Abu Ja`far once sent messages to Samarra with
one of his reliable partisans, but the messenger
inserted a letter amongst the other messages without the
Saf’ir's knowledge. In Samarra he received answers to
all the letters except his own(4).
The second Saf’irsometimes dealt directly with certain agents with whom
he had previously communicated indirectly. The career of
Muhammad b. `Ali al‑Aswad is a good example of such a
case. According to al‑Saduq, al‑Aswad used to bring the
legal taxes for the Imam to Abu Ja`far, who commanded
him to hand them over to the well‑known scholar
al‑`Abbas b. Ma`ruf al‑Qummi(5),
and did not offer him any receipt(6).
However, we later find al‑Aswad dealing directly with the second
Saf’irand the third Saf’ir, who both received in person
the money which al‑Aswad had collected from the Imamites(7).
3. The Effect of the Shiite Revolutionary Activities upon the 'Abbasids'
Attitude towards the Twelfth Imam
3.1) The events of the second Saf’ir's career suggest that he instructed
his agents to avoid any act which might lead the
government of the day to think that the Imamites still
had political aspirations or that they had an Imam
leading them secretly. Despite the fact that he directed
the Imamites to maintain this policy, the political
activities of the other Shiite groups, particularly the
Zaydites, the Qaramita and the Isma`ilis, complicated
the Imamites' relations with the `Abbasids and made it
difficult for them to keep the existence of the Twelfth
Imam totally concealed from their opponents.
When the Zanj revolution (255‑270/866‑883) was taking place the situation
of the Imamites was critical. The leader of that
revolution, `Ali b. Muhammad, traced his lineage to the
brother of Imam al‑Baqir, Zayd b. `Ali. For this reason
a considerable group of `Alids joined his side and
participated in his uprising from the year 257/871.(8)
In spite of the fact that the eleventh Imam, al‑`Askari, had openly
announced that the leader of the Zanj was not a member
of the People of the House (Ahl al‑Bayt),(9)
the authorities considered this revolution to be linked
with the `Alids. According to al‑Tabari, the collapse of
the Zanj revolt in 270/883 was followed by governmental
propaganda against the `Alids in general. This attitude
can be discerned in the poem of Yahya b. Muhammad
al‑Aslami, who praised the `Abbasid leader al‑Muwaffaq
in 270/883 with this verse:
And the Book of Allah is recited in every mosque, and the Talibiyyin
invite people to their cause in vain(10).
It is most likely that the `Abbasid antagonism towards extreme Shi’ite
groups extended also to the Imamites. According to
al‑Tusi, the Imamites were too frightened to express
their doctrine openly between the years 270‑273/883‑887.(11)
Another factor which strained relations between the Imamites and the
`Abbdsids was the discovery of the underground
activities of the two Isma’ill parties, the original
Isma’lis and the Qaramita(12).
Like the Imamites, the Isma`ilis had reported the
Prophetic traditions stating that al-Qa’im al‑Mahdi
would go into occultation as a preparatory action for
his rising(13).
However, they interpreted some of these traditions in a manner which
would support their struggle to gain immediate success
in North Africa (al‑Maghrib). Thus they understood the
tradition which states that al-Qa’im al‑Mahdi will
appear when the sun rises from the place of its setting
to mean that the Qa'im would rise in the west
(al‑Maghrib)(14).
Furthermore they applied other traditions narrated by the Imamites about
al-Qa’im al-Mahdi to their own concealed leader, who
had organized his followers into a strong underground
movement and had commanded them to extend their
activities into new areas by military means to prepare
for his rising as al-Qa’im al‑Mahdi(15).
According to Sa'd al‑Ash`ari the number of the Qaramita
increased in the villages around Kufa, and according to
al‑Nawbakhti, they gained about 100,000 partisans there(16).
Afterwards they expanded their propaganda on the western shores of the
Gulf and Yemen, where a large number of Arabs accepted
their cause, thus helping them to become powerful. As a
result of all this they announced their rebellion(17),
which according to al‑Tabari occurred in the suburbs of
Kufa in 278/891.(18)
In the occultation of the Twelfth Imam the Isma'ilis seem to have found a
good opportunity to use the Imamite masses in their
political struggle. According to Ibn al‑Athir, the
Qaramita missionary Yahya b. al‑Mahdi went to Bahrain,
which had a large Shi ite population. In 281/894 he
contacted an eminent Shiite leader, `Ali b. al‑Mu'alla
b. Hamdan, and informed him that he had been sent by
al‑Mahdi to inform his followers that his rising was at
hand. `Ali b. al‑Mu'alla was satisfied with the message
and revealed it to the Shiites in the town of Qatif and
other villages of Bahrain. They in turn accepted it and
promised that they too would support al‑Mahdi if he
rose. By such means the Qaramita succeeded in
circulating their propaganda among the Arab tribe of
Qays and began to collect the khums.(19)
By using the same methods, they expanded their activities among the
tribes of Asad, Tayy and Tamim in the Sawad; while in
the desert of the Samawa, the tribe of Banu al‑`Ulays,
which used to protect the trade route between Kufa and
Damascus, also joined their side(20).
It is worth mentioning that the Qaramita took into consideration the
sectarian beliefs and economic situation of the people
with whom they worked. Therefore we find that their
propaganda spread mainly among people who already had
Shiite inclinations, such as the Qarmatiyyun, who had
participated in the Zanj revolt(21),
and also among the people of the Sawad(22),
who wished to join the side of any rebel in order to
improve their social and economic conditions.
There is evidence that the Qaramita permitted their followers to kill
their opponents and confiscate their property(23).
The Imamites seem to have been aware of the danger of such a principle,
since the 'Abbasid government might accuse them of
holding the same principle and it could be easy for it
to attack them under this pretext. Since both the
Qaramita and the Imamites were Shiites and lived in the
same areas, practicing the same religious rites,
expecting the rise of al-Qa’im al‑Mahdi in the near
future, it was difficult for the government to
differentiate between them without extensive and careful
investigation.
3.2) The Twelfth Imam wanted to protect his followers from the influence
of the Qaramita and make the government of the day
differentiate between the Qaramita and his own
adherents. Perhaps this is why he is said to have sent a
letter to his second Saf’ir, in which he denounced and
cursed Muhammad b. Abi Zaynab and his followers (the
Qaramita). He declared that he had no relations with
them and ordered his 'followers neither to have any
discussion with them nor to attend their gatherings. The
second Saf’ircirculated the pronouncement of the Imam
among the Imamites via his agent Ishaq b. Ya`qub(24).
It seems most likely that the Imamites obeyed the instructions in the
pronouncement. According to Ibn al‑Athir, a group of
people from Kufa revealed to the Abbasid authorities the
underground activities of the Qaramita in their area and
informed them that they were inventing rules contrary to
Islamic law, according to which it was permissible to
murder any Muslim other than those who paid them an oath
of allegiance. Ibn al‑Athir also reports that later a
group of Talibiyyun fought beside the government against
the Qaramita in Kufa(25).
It is plausible that in both of these instances these groups were
Imamites, and that these steps were part of their plan
to make the `Abbasids realize in a practical way that
they were not responsible for the Qaramita's activities.
However, there is evidence that the `Abbasids paid no attention to the
Imamite claims(26).
The period of al‑Mu'tadid (279‑289/892‑901) was
distinguished as one of oppression and pursuit for the
Imamites. It was well known among the Sunni scholars
like al‑Ash`ari that the Imamites had achieved a
consensus in respect of the prohibition of any militant
revolution unless the Imam himself appeared and ordered
them to such action(27).
But the propaganda of the Qaramita concerning the rise of al-Qa’im
al‑Mahdi seems to have encouraged the government to link
their activities with the occultation of the Twelfth
Imam and to consider them as a preparation for his
rising. They were certainly encouraged in this direction
by the fact that the cousin of the Twelfth Imam, Muhsin
b. Ja`far b. `Ali al‑Hadi involved himself in the
Qaramita's rebellion in Damascus(28).
This critical situation gave the opponents of the Imamites a vital
weapon, which the viziers used not only against the
Imamites but also against their own colleagues who were
anti‑Shi`ite(29).
In 278/891 the caliph, al‑Mu'tamid, ordered the arrest
of a member of the Imamite family Banu Furat who had
held the office of Diwan al‑Sawad. The family members
hid themselves, but Abu Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Furat was
still arrested(30).
In the same time al‑Mu`tamid appointed `Ubayd Allah b. Sulayman, who was
well‑known for his anti‑`Alid attitude(31),
to the office of the wizara(32).
If one can link the uprising of the Qaramita in 278/891
with these two steps ‑ taking into account the attitude
of `Ubayd Allah b. Sulayman ‑ one can claim that `Ubayd
Allah's appointment was part of the precautions taken by
the `Abbasids against Shiite activities in general.
Afterward, al‑Mu’tadid carried out a careful investigation of Shiite
underground cells in general. In 282/895 he discovered
that Muhammad b. Zayd, the head of the Zaydite state in
Tabaristan, was sending 32,000 dinars every year to
Muhammad b. Ward al‑`Attar so that he could distribute
the money among the `Alids in Baghdad, Kufa, Mecca and
Medina(33).
The continual investigations of al-Mutadid caused the arrest and murder
of many `Alids; according to al‑Isfahani they were not
Qaramita, but were simply persecuted under that pretext(34).
As a result of these measures, the authorities realized that the Imamites
had their own organization. According to al‑Kulayni the
spies of the vizier `Ubayd Allah b. Sulayman discovered
that the Imamites still had an Imam who guided their
activities secretly. Al-Kulayni reports:
"Al‑Husayn b. al‑Hasan al‑ `Alawi said that two intimates of Badr Hasani
(the servant of the caliph) were talking and one of them
said, `Why, he (the Twelfth Imam) is collecting money
and has agents, wukala’. Afterwards they named all the
agents in all the districts. Then they reported this
information to the vizier `Ubayd Allah b. Sulayman, who
endeavoured to arrest them. But the caliph (al‑Mu`tadid)
told him to search for the place of this man (the Imam),
because this matter was important. `Ubayd Allah b.
Sulaymdn said, `Let us arrest the agents.' But the
caliph said, `No, but infiltrate among them some spies
who are unknown (in their service to the government),
and ask them to give money to the agents. Then arrest
anyone who accepts the money."(35)
Al‑Kulayni does not mention the date of this incident, but we know that
`Ubayd Allah b. Sulayman continued in the service to the
caliph al‑Mu tadid until the year 288/900, so this
incident must have taken place between the years
282‑288/895‑900.
It is clear from this report that the
'Abbasid spies had reached the conclusion that the
eleventh Imam al‑`Askari had in fact left a successor,
who directed the underground activities of his agents;
but they were unsure of his place of residence. So they
tried to arrest some of his agents and partisans, hoping
that by interrogating them they might also arrest the
Twelfth Imam. For this reason, the caliph ordered that
spies be sent with money to infiltrate amongst the
agents.
(1)Al-`Abbasiyya was a fief in
Baghdad granted to al-`Abbas, the brother of the
caliph al-Mansur. According to al-Khatib
al-Baghdadi there were two fiefs of the same
name, one on the eastern side of Baghdad and the
other on the western side. Because the house of
Abu Ja`far was on the western side, the meeting
may have occurred there; al-Khatib,I,79, 95.
(5)Al-`Abbas b. Ma`ruf was a
companion to the tenth Imam, al-Hadi. He devoted
his time during the short occultation to
relating Imamite narrations; therefore, perhaps,
Abu Ja`far originally ordered al-Aswad to hand
the money over to Ibn Ma`ruf because al-Aswad,
at that time, was not aware of the necessity of
the underground organization. For a full account
of the career of Ibn Ma’ruf as a narrator of
Imamite narrations which criticise those Shiites
who considered Ibn al-Hanafiyya or the seventh
Imam Musa al-Kazim, as the hidden Imam, see
Ikhtiyar,315, 461; al-Najashi,215-6, 151;
al-Tusi, Tahdhib al-Ahkam,IV,122, 137, V, 292,
VI, 122, 194.
(8)Tabari,III,1857, 2024,
2109; for a full account of the Zanj revolt see
the two important articles by Naji, "Tarikh
al-Tabari Masdaran `an Thawrat
al-Zanj",al-Mawrid VII, No. 2 (1978), 37-92; and
"al-Tanzim al-`Askari li jaysh Sahib al Zanj",
al-Mu`arikh al-`Arabi,VII (1978), 116-157;
Faysal al-Samir, Thawrat al Zanj (Basra,1952).
(9)al-Irbili, Kashf
al-Ghumma,IV, 428; Bihar, L, 293.
(11)Al-Tusi reports that the
tomb of al-Husayn collapsed in 273/886 probably
due to an act of sabotage, especially if one
bears in mind the fact that an attack upon the
grave of `Ali was foiled about the same time;
al-Tusi, Tahdhib al-Ahkam, VI,111-12.
(12)For the distinction
between the Mubarakiyya and the Qaramita, see Q.
Maqalat,80-6; N. Firaq,67-74; al-Fusul
al-Mukhtara,247-8.
(13)T. al-Ghayba,39,130. The
Isma'ili writer Ibn Hawshab narrates in al-Kashf
several Qur'anic verses about the Last Day,
which for him means the rise of al-Qa’im
al-Mahdi (al-Kashf 5-6, 10, 11, 14, 24; Abu
Ya`qub al-Sijistani, Kashf al- Mahjub
(Teheran,1949, 81-3). Moreover, Ibn Hawshab
mentions a narration attributed to al-Sadiq,
stating that al-Qa’im will rise in Mecca. Thus
he agrees with the Imamite reports regarding
this point; al-Kashf 32-5.
(14)Ibn Hawshab, Asrar
al-Nutaqa',51-3, 90-2. For the details of the
Isma`ili use of these traditions in their
activities with the tribe of Kitama in 280/893,
see al-Kamil, VIII, 24-5, 26.
(15)Ibn Hawshab, al-Kashf 62;
al-Kamil, VIII, 22-3; Ivanow supports this point
in suggesting that "the terrible slaughter of
the pilgrims in the Ka`ba itself, and the
seizure of the sacred relics were not acts of
wanton cruelty, but were connected with some
expectations of a religious character, such as
the return of Muhammad b. Isma`il in full glory,
etc., which most probably was expected to be due
about that time." Ivanow, "Ismailis and
Qarmatians", Journal of the Bombay Branch of the
Royal Asiatic Society, XVI (1940), 82; also see
W. Madelung, "Karmati", E.I.2.
(16)N. Firaq,76; al-Tabari
confirms this number; Tabari, II, 2218.
(19)al-Kamil,VII,340-1, VIII,
21-2. There is evidence which encourages the
present writer to link the activities of the
Qaramita with those of the Ismailis. Ibn Hawqal
mentions that after the establishment of the
Qaramita state in Bahrain they used to send the
khums to the Sahib al-Zaman,that is the Ismaili
leader in Egypt; Ibn Hawqal, op. cit.,21-3.
(20)Tabari,III,2218; Ibn
Hawqal, op. cit.,29.
(21)Tabari,III,1757. Shaban
put forward the theory that the Isma'ili
movement in Iraq and Bahrain was called the
Qaramita after a specific race called al-Qaramatiyyun.
They came originally from Libya and they could
hardly speak Arabic. They took part in the Zanj
revolt and joined the Ismaili movement when the
revolt collapsed. (Shaban, op. cit,130).
(25)al-Kamil,VIII,311, 376.
(26)Tabari,III,2127-8;
al-Kamil,VII,311.
(27)al-Ash`ari, Maqalat
al-Islamiyyin,58; Ibn Shadhan, al-Idah,475.
(28)Later in 300/912 Muhsin
was arrested in the suburbs of Damascus. His
head was sent to Baghdad, where it was impaled
on a bridge in the eastern side of the city, an
area which was inhabited by a large Shiite
population; Maqatil,449; al-Kubaysi, op.
cit.,446.
(29)`Ali b. Isa, who was known
for his anti `Alid attitude, was called a
Qarmati by his personal enemies; as a result he
was dismissed from office (`Arib, op. cit., 59).
Al-Qasim al-Khaqani was discharged in the same
manner. Later al-Hallaj was arrested on the
accusation that he was a Qarmatian missionary;
Nujum,III,182; Ibn Taymiyya, Aami'
al-Rasa'il,I,188.
(30)al-Sabi, al-Wuzara,292-3;
Tabari,III,2123.
(32)Tabari,III,2123. `Ubayd
Allah b. Sulayman was a close associate of al-Muwaffaq
in Samaria in 264/878, but four years later he
was imprisoned. When al-Mu`tadid became the
heir-apparent to al-Mu`tamid, `Ubayd Allah was
promoted to the office of the wizara,whereupon
he used his office to pursue his rivals such as
Bann Furat. At the same time he managed to
uncover the activities of the agents of the
second Saf’ir. He died in 288/900;
al-Kafi,I,525; al-Kamil,VII,219, 227, 309; al-Fakhri,
302.
(33)Tabari,III,2148;
al-Muntazam, V,150.
(34)Al-Isfahani mentions that
two `Alids, Muhammad b. `Ali b. Ibiahim and `Ali
b. Muhammad b. `Ali, were tortured along with
the Qarmati Sahib al-Kahl, whose hands and legs
were cut off, yet they did not support the
Qaramita nor did they have any relations with
them (Maqatil,446). Al-Tabari states twice that
the `Abbasid troops arrested a group of Qaramita
in 286/899 and investigated them. They disclosed
the name of their leader, Abu Hashim b. Sadaqa
al-Katib, who was arrested and put in jail
(Tabari III,2179). Al-Mu`tadid's investigation
of the Qaramita leader, Abu al-Fawaris, shows
that he differentiated between the doctrine of
the Qaramita and the Imamites; al-Kamil,VII,354
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